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Abstract
By inserting the dialogue between Einstein, Schlick and Reichenbach into a wider network of debates about the epis-
temology of geometry, this paper shows that not only did Einstein and Logical Empiricists come to disagree about the
role, principled or provisional, played by rods and clocks in General Relativity, but also that in their lifelong interchange,
they never clearly identified the problem they were discussing. Einstein’s reflections on geometry can be understood
only in the context of his “measuring rod objection” against Weyl. On the contrary, Logical Empiricists, though care-
fully analyzing the Einstein-Weyl debate, tried to interpret Einstein’s epistemology of geometry as a continuation of
the Helmholtz-Poincaré debate by other means. The origin of the misunderstanding, it is argued, should be found in
the failed appreciation of the difference between a “Helmholtzian” and a “Riemannian” tradition. The epistemological
problems raised by General Relativity are extraneous to the first tradition and can only be understood in the context of
the latter, the philosophical significance of which, however, still needs to be fully explored.
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1. Introduction
Mara Beller in her classical Quantum dialogue (Beller,
1999) famously suggested a “dialogical” approach to the
history of science. According to Beller, the scientific dis-
course always addresses the discourse of other scientists,
who in turn may react by changing their views in response.
In Beller’s view, scientific discourse is not only dialogi-
cal but also “polyphonic”. Different dialogues overlap and
nurture each other to form a communicative network, the
analysis of which is indispensable in understanding the sin-
gle contributions.
Beller of course provided her own celebrated dialogical
analysis of the emergence of the so-called “Copenhagen in-
terpretation” of quantum mechanics. Such a methodologi-
cal approach, however, could be effectively extended to the
history of philosophy of science. In particular there is little
doubt that the dialogue about the epistemology of geom-
etry between Albert Einstein and the Logical Empiricists,
mainly Moritz Schlick and Hans Reichenbach, represents
one of the decisive moments, if not the decisive moment,
of 20th century philosophy of science (Howard, 2009). In
this dialogue Logical Empiricists established the founda-
tion of their new kind of empiricism which, for better or
worse, inspired a generation of philosophers.
As we shall see, this dialogue is related to other di-
alogues: the debate between Einstein, Max Born, Paul
Ehrenfest, Max von Laue and others around the 1910s on
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the notion of rigid bodies in Special Relativity (§2.1), and
most of all to the debate between Einstein, Herman Weyl
and Walter Dellänbach (§3) on the role of rigid rods and
clocks in General Relativity (§2.2) around the 1920s. In
turn, these dialogues bear a complex relation to a series
of controversies, between Bernhard Riemann, Herman von
Helmholtz, Henri Poincaré and others, which burst forth
in the second half on 19th century after the “discovery” of
non-Euclidean geometries (Torretti, 1978).
Einstein’s dialogue with Schlick and Reichenbach must
then be understood against a backdrop of this rich and
variegated web of interrelated dialogical interchanges, in
which every argument reveals its full meaning only when
regarded as a response to other arguments. The aim of
this paper is to show that this dialogue, considered in its
proper historical setting, can be singled out by a sort of
peculiarity: its protagonists never really agreed on what
they where discussing and, surprisingly, never seemed to
have noticed.
In recent literature the Einstein-Logical Empiricists de-
bate has been regarded as a philosophical controversy con-
cerning a problem that the “parties to the instrument”
univocally identified: whether measuring rods and clocks
do or should play an epistemologically fundamental role in
General Relativity. Einstein, until the end of his life, ar-
gued that the theory has empirical content, as soon as one
assumes the existence of rigid infinitesimal rods that can
be used to measure the interval between any two neighbor-
ing points (Stachel, 1989). However, he also recognized on
several occasions that this was only a sort of practical com-
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promise (Howard, 1990, 1994), or at least he was forced by
Weyl to recognize it (Ryckman, 1995). Both Weyl and the
Logical Empiricists can then be considered as “Einstein’s
agonists”, even if they were speaking up for “different Ein-
steins” (Ryckman, 1996, 2005), or perhaps two different
sides of the “same Einstein” (Howard, 2005, 2009).
The “received view” can then be roughly summarized
as follows: In the 1920s the Logical Empiricists, especially
Schlick and Reichenbach, were convinced they were follow-
ing Einstein’s guidance in assuming that without rods and
clocks the “edifice of physics” would be deprived of em-
pirical content (Friedman, 2002); however, Einstein, more
in consonance with Weyl, accepted this assumption only
provisionally: the behavior of rods and clocks should be
in principle derived from the theory and not used to grant
its observational basis (Ryckman, 2005).
Recent historical literature had thus made enormous
progress in revealing the complex “dialogical” background
hidden behind the apparently monolithic Einstein-Logical
Empiricists-epistemology of geometry (see Fogel, 2008, ch.
3, 4 for an excellent overview). Einstein’s position turned
out to be much more sophisticated than the Logical Em-
piricists had believed, and most of all rather at odds with
their own empiricism. In my opinion, however, recent liter-
ature has been strangely recalcitrant in making the succes-
sive step to unraveling a rather discomforting truth about
the “emperor’s clothes”. Actually Einstein and the Logical
Empiricists were simply not discussing the same problem.
The celebrated dialogue to which modern philosophy of
science owes its origin was a dialogue of the deaf.
Logical Empiricists were convinced that the Helmholtz-
Poincaré controversy over the empirical-conventional choice
among the class of possible (Euclidean or non-Euclidean)
Riemannian geometries could be extended in the new gen-
eral relativistic context (Friedman, 1995), by substituting
a stipulation about the congruence of “finite rigid bod-
ies” with that of “infinitesimal rigid rods” (Torretti, 1983,
239f.). Einstein was rather exclusively concerned with the
very existence of rigid infinitesimal rods, which is presup-
posed by Riemannian geometry, but — as Weyl had shown
— is far from being necessary. Einstein’s rather sporadic
references to the Helmholtz-Poincaré debate served then to
meet Weyl’s challenge rhetorically in semi-popular writing,
rather then make a case for conventionalism (§4.2; §4.5).
As we shall see in detail, the Logical Empiricists knew
the issue raised by Weyl very well and discussed it at
length — in particular Reichenbach — along with Ein-
stein’s counter-objection, thereby displaying a vast knowl-
edge of all technical details (§4.1; §4.3; §4.4; §5); how-
ever, they surprisingly never came to realize that Ein-
stein’s epistemological reflections on geometry precisely
addressed Weyl’s criticism of the use of rods and clocks
as direct metrical indicators. Even more puzzling is the
fact that Einstein, in turn, apparently never felt compelled
to clear up the misunderstanding, neither in private cor-
respondence nor in published writings, nurturing the re-
ciprocal illusion that the debate revolved around a well-
identified problem to which the contenders gave different
solutions.
The historical dialogue between Einstein and the Log-
ical Empiricists found its crowning moment in the famous
imaginary dialogue between “Reichenbach” and “Poincaré”
staged by Einstein in his final “Remarks” for the Library
of Living Philosopher’s volume published in the late 1940s.
As Reichenbach’s successive reply shows, even on that
occasion, Einstein and Reichenbach did not come to an
agreement on what the apple of discord was (§6). For
more than thirty years Einstein, Schlick and Reichenbach
were engaged in a lively discussion about the epistemol-
ogy of geometry, but for more than thirty years they were
talking at cross-purposes.
If our reconstruction turns out to be correct, we then
have to face the ugly truth that the epoch-making debate
in which philosophy of science was defined as an indepen-
dent discipline was based in hindsight on a quite simple
misunderstanding. There are still, however, some relevant
lessons that can be drawn from an accurate historical re-
construction of this debate. In contrast to what the Logi-
cal Empiricists thought and what it is still often argued in
the literature, what we may call the “Helmholtzian” tradi-
tion which traversed 19th century geometry did not play
any relevant role in the emergence of General Relativity,
and is utterly inadequate to understand the philosophi-
cal problems that theory raised.Einstein’s theory drew its
conceptual resources exclusively from what we may call a
“Riemannian tradition”, that, although evolving in paral-
lel during roughly the same years, philosophers have often
neglected to adequately investigate (§7).
2. From Finite Rigid Bodies to Infinitesimal Rigid
Rods: Einstein between Geometry and Reality
2.1. Finite Rigid Bodies in Special Relativity
Early on, Einstein insisted on the “epistemological” im-
portance of “rigid bodies” as the mediating element to con-
nect geometry with physical reality. Already in his 1905
paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, Einstein
pointed out that in a coordinate system at rest the posi-
tion of a body can be determined “by the employment of
rigid measuring rods [Maßstäbe] under the methods of Eu-
clidean geometry and expressed in Cartesian co-ordinates”
(Einstein, 1905, 892). A Cartesian system of co-ordinates
can be thought of as a cubical framework formed by rigid
unit rods. Translations of such a rigid cube into itself can
be used to introduce number triples as coordinates and
these can then be employed as marks of position through-
out the entire space. To specify relations in time, we re-
quire in addition a standard clock (in general a system
which runs down periodically) placed, say, at the origin
of our Cartesian system of coordinates or frame of ref-
erence. In this context, the introduction of coordinates
could therefore be directly defined by measurements made
by rigid bodies and uniformly ticking clocks (see for in-
stance Einstein, 1907, 439).
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As early as 1907, however, Einstein pointed out that
in Special Relativity it is difficult to clarify the behav-
ior of bodies and clocks in accelerated frames of reference
(Einstein, 1907, §18; in particular 455). In 1909 Max Born
(Born, 1909), referring to Einstein’s 1907 paper, suggested
a Lorentz invariant definition of a rigid body (the so called
Born rigidity condition). “The method used by me,” Born
writes, “consists in defining rigidity by a differential law
instead of an integral law” (Born, 1909, 3); in particu-
lar Born defined analytically “the differential conditions
of rigidity” by using a quadratic form of three spacial dif-
ferentials (Born, 1909, §2 ).
In addition to the paper published in the Annalen der
Physik, Born presented the results of his work at the meet-
ing of the German Society of Scientists and Physicians
(Salzburg, 21-25 September 1909), which was also attended
by Einstein. The results were published one year later
(Born, 1910). On that occasion Born mentioned Gustav
Herglotz’s result that in Special Relativity a rigid body has
only three degrees of freedom, in contrast to the six of clas-
sical mechanics (Herglotz, 1910; see also Noether, 1910).
Just four day after the meeting Paul Ehrenfest published
in Physikalische Zeitschrift a celebrated paper discussing
how an ideally rigid cylinder cannot be brought from rest
into a state of rotation about its axis of symmetry, with-
out violating Lorentz Invariance (Ehrenfest, 1909). The
paradox became well known as the “Ehrenfest Paradox”
(cf. Grøn, 2004).
In private correspondence Einstein declared his interest
in “[t]he latest relativity-theoretical investigations of Born
and Herglotz . . . It really seems,” he argued, “that in the
theory of relativity there does not exist a ‘rigid’ body with
6 degrees of freedom” (to in Jakob Laub, March 1910,
CPAE: 5. 232; tr. in Stachel, 1989). In 1911 Max von
Laue, developing the works of Born, Ehrenfest, Herglotz
and Noether, showed that in Special Relativity an accel-
erated body has an infinite amount of degrees of freedom,
thus implying that rigid bodies cannot exist. By assuming
that “a propagation with superluminal speed is excluded
for all physical effects” (von Laue, 1911, 86), Laue showed
that an impulse simultaneously acting on n different points
of a body will necessarily result in at least n degrees of free-
dom. Einstein explicitly mentioned a similar result in a
discussion following the lecture version of Die Relativitäts-
Theorie (Zurich, 16 January 1911; published as Einstein,
1911): “There can be altogether no rigid body according
to the Theory of Relativity” (CPAE 3, Doc. 17, 443). If we
move a part of a rigid body then also the other end should
immediately move. However, this would be an infinitely
fast signal which is not acceptable in Special Relativity.
Thus, although Einstein did not participate publicly
in the discussion of the Ehrenfest Paradox, he was well
aware of the difficulties that lurk in the definition of a
“rigid body” in Special Relativity (cf. Sauer, 2008). How-
ever, the concept of “rigid body” apparently continued to
play for him the fundamental “epistemological” role of me-
diating between abstract geometry and physical geometry:
“the propositions of Euclidean geometry,” Einstein noticed
in his 1912 lectures on Special Relativity “obtain physi-
cal content”, if they are interpreted as “propositions con-
cerning arrangements [Gruppierungen] of material straight
lines and tracts in relative rest” (CPAE 4, Doc. 1, 36).
In a footnote attached to this passage, Einstein labeled
this definition as “woolly [unscharf] (Rotation)” (CPAE
4, Doc. 1, 104; n. 56). The reference is probably to
the the famous “rigidly rotating disk” thought experiment
(Stachel, 1989), which Einstein mentioned for the first time
in a published paper in February 1912 (Einstein, 1912, §1).
Einstein came to the conclusion — reached independently
by Theodere Kaluza (Kaluza, 1910) — that the proposi-
tions of Euclidean geometry cannot hold exactly on the
rotating disc nor in general within a gravitational field.
However, according to Einstein, “[t]he measuring rods as
well as the coordinate axes are to be considered as rigid
bodies”, “even though the rigid body cannot possess real
existence” (Einstein, 1912, 131).
2.2. Infinitesimal Rigid Rods and General Relativity
As Abrahm Pais has noted, “the celebrated problem of
the rigid body in the special theory of relativity stimulated
Einstein’s step to curved space, later in 1912” (Pais, 1982,
202). Einstein was forced to rethink the relationship be-
tween coordinates and measurements with rods and clocks
(Stachel, 1989) and to abandon the restrictions imposed by
Euclidean geometry; moreover Born’s mathematical tech-
nique may have led him to consider quadratic differen-
tial forms with variable coefficients (Maltese and Orlando,
1995). As is well known, around 1912 Einstein was intro-
duced to the work of Erwin Bruno Christoffel (Christof-
fel, 1869), Gregorio Ricci-Curbastro and Levi-Civita (Levi-
Civita and Ricci-Curbastro, 1900) by his mathematician
friend Marcel Grossmann. In 1913, together with Gross-
mann, Einstein saw how to formulate, at least in outline,
a theory of gravitation based on the expression ds2 =∑
gµνdxµdxν , whose coefficients gµν represent the behav-
ior of measuring rods and clocks with reference to the coor-
dinate system, as well as the potentials of the gravitational
field (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913).
In this context, co-ordinates lost their simple metri-
cal significance and do not directly signify lengths mea-
sured by a unit measuring rod any more: The length of a
measuring rod is not determined solely by the coordinate
differentials dx1, dx2, dx3 but also by the six functions
g11, g22, g33. In a four dimensional manifold the measure
of time is similarly influenced by the gravitational poten-
tial g44, so that the distance of two neighboring events,
measured with the aid of a portable clock, is different
from the differential dx4 of the time coordinate: “From
this one sees that, for given dx1, dx2, dx3, dx4” the interval
ds which “corresponds to these differentials can be deter-
mined only if one knows the quantities gµν that determine
the gravitational field” (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913,
9). Thus, one does not know the meaning of “distance”
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between two events, specified initially by physically mean-
ingless co-ordinates xν , until one knows the coefficients
gµν . On the other hand, after a coordinate system has
been introduced, the gµν should in principle be obtained
from the direct measurement of space-like and time-like
distances.
In the Entwurf-paper, Einstein found the solution to
this conundrum by assuming that one can construct a Eu-
clidean or Minkowskian coordinate-system with unit rods
and clocks in an small enough (in astronomical propor-
tions) region of space-time. Instead of the general coor-
dinates xν , one can introduce the rectangular coordinates
ξν , in which ds2 = dξ 21 +dξ 22 +dξ 23 +dξ 24 , i.e. Special Rel-
ativity is valid, where the gµν are constant; the invariant
measure of the distance between two space-time points ds,
as determined by unit rods and clocks not accelerated in
this frame, is referred to by Einstein as “naturally mea-
sured” (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913, 8).
In the last sections of the successive systematic exposi-
tion of the Entwurf -theory, Die formale Grundlage der all-
gemeinen Relativitätstheorie (Einstein, 1914) — presented
to the Berlin Academy in 1914 — Einstein suggested the
implications that the new theory could have on the philoso-
phy of geometry. Traditionally geometry presupposes that
“two points of a ‘rigid’ body must be separated by a certain
distance, which is independent of the position of the bodies;
the propositions of geometry completed with this statement
are (in a physical sense) either right or wrong” (Einstein,
1914, 1079; my emphasis). These propositions are con-
sidered as integral laws, since they “deal with distance of
points at a finite region” (Einstein, 1914, 1079). General
Relativity has forced us to adopt a near-geometrical ap-
proach — akin to that of Maxwell in physics — by “grad-
ually introducing the requirement that the finite distances
between points could no longer appear in the elementary
laws” (Einstein, 1914, 1080; my emphasis). Rigid finite
bodies are substituted by infinitesimal rigid rods so that
the propositions of geometry “are reduced to differential
laws” (Einstein, 1914, 1080; cf. D’Agostino, 2000, 235).
After having presented the field equations for deter-
mining the gµν in November 1915 (Einstein, 1915c,d,a,b),
in §4 of his March 1916 review paper Die Grundlage der
allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie (Einstein, 1916), Einstein
returned to the conditions necessary to compare the pre-
dictions of the theory with the observed facts. He insisted
again on the fact that “ds2 is a quantity ascertainable
by rod-clock measurement of point-events infinitely proxi-
mate in space-time, and defined independently of any par-
ticular choice of co-ordinates” (Einstein, 1916, 776). More
precisely the gµν can be found stepwise in the failure to
extend the local Minkowski coordinates over larger regions
of space-times; they are the numbers to which we have to
multiply the coordinate distances in order to assure ds2 has
the same length all over the manifold. Of course the same
length can be determined only up to an arbitrary constant;
so one still needs to make a global choice of the “units in
which we shall express the length of lines” (Lorentz, 1917,
1345).
2.3. Atoms and Clocks
To appreciate the physical meaning of this last remark,
it is useful to look at a paper that the Austrian Physi-
cist Ludwig Flamm sent to the Physikalische Zeitschrift
in September 1916. Illustrating the Schwarzschild solu-
tion (Schwarzschild, 1916) in a geometrical form, Flamm
explains with admirable clarity under which conditions it
is possible to perform measurements in General Relativity:
If one chooses as an elementary clock the red line
emitted by a cadmium atom [die rote Kadmium-
linie aussendende Molekül] and sets its period of
oscillation as the time unit, then one recognizes
at once [ohne weiteres] that, because of the con-
stancy of the velocity of light [wegen jener Kon-
stanz der Lichtgeschwindigkeit], the metrical unit
length at every place and in every time must coin-
cide [decken muss] with the same number of wave
lengths of the cadmium red line [der roten Kad-
miumlinie]. Similarly, if one set an elementary
measuring-rod as the lattice spacing [Distanzgit-
ter] of the rock-salt crystal [Steinsalzkristalls], one
would reach the same conclusion in relation to the
“naturally measured” velocity of light. This funda-
mental presupposition lies at the basis of General
Theory of Relativity, that for instance the ratio
between the wave-length of the red cadmium line
and the lattice constant of rock salt is an absolute
constant. Also in an arbitrary gravitational field,
this constant must be from independent of place
and orientation and of the time point [Zeitpunkt]
(Flamm, 1916, 451; my emphasis).
General Relativity is built on the assumption that ideal
clocks are not affected by the presence of a gravitational
field. If two cadmium atoms are brought together to the
same place, they will always show the same frequency,
6436.4696 Å, for the cadmium red line (Jackson, 1936).
If we set this rate of ticking as the unit clock, we have
then defined a time unit which can easily be reproduced
all over the manifold, since all cadmium atoms’ red lines
will show the same frequency and same rate of ticking. Of
course, the particular standard clock used does not matter
because the only effect of changing from one clock to an-
other is to change the unit of time with the ratio of the two
units being constant. As Flamm points out, the ratio of
the wavelength of the red cadmium spectral line over the
lattice distance of rock-salt crystal is an absolute constant
of nature.
Referring to Lamm’s paper, among others, in his lec-
tures on the foundations of physics held in Winter Term
1916-1917, David Hilbert seems to already be clear about
the epistemological difficulties which lurk behind this as-
sumption:
In order to read the time one needs a clock. Such
a clock can be found realized in nature in the great-
est conceivable perfection in an oscillating and light-
emitting atom [Molekül], let’s say a yellow spectral
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line of the sodium atom . . . The proper time T
of an oscillating atom is independent of the grav-
itational field, in which the atom is located . . .
This axiom has of course . . . only a provisional
character. When physics will be finally fully de-
veloped [vollständig ausgebaut], then the axiom
must appear as a consequence of the general theory
(Hilbert, 1917, 284; my emphasis)
In order to perform measurements in General Relativity
one must assume as an axiom that, for instance, the yel-
low emission line of sodium vapor measured by an observer
at rest with respect to the atom will always be 5893 Å. If
we set this as the unit of length, the ticking of such clocks
provides a measure of the length of a time-like world-line.
Two identical clocks in different positions within a grav-
itational field ( let’s say, on the earth and on the sun)
measure, of course, a different elapsed time (first clock ef-
fect or twin paradox). As a consequence, the frequency
of a signal emitted by one clock would appear to be in-
creased (red shift) or decreased (blue shift) if measured at
the position of the other clock (Hilbert, 1917, 285; cf. Ear-
man and Glymour, 1980; Hentschel, 1994). However, the
rate of ticking of identical clocks, as measured by a nearby
observer, is assumed to be independent of the world-line
on which the measurements are made. Such an “axiom”
allows the comparison of lengths measured at a distance
as Riemannian geometry requires.
At the end of the passage just quoted, Hilbert makes an
epistemological point that cannot fade into silence. Gen-
eral Relativity assumes this “axiom”, but it cannot prove it
through its own conceptual resources. Thus this assump-
tion has only a provisional character. At a later stage of
development of physics it should appear, however, as the
consequence of the theory. Even if it is hard to track down
Hilbert’s sources, his phrasing reveals a clear similarity
with that of Einstein, who, as we shall see, had started
at about the same time to attribute to this very issue a
fundamental epistemological importance, which contem-
porary philosophers, alas, have not always been able to
appreciate.
3. Schlick’s Early Conventionalism and Einstein’s
Discussion with Weyl and Dällenbach
As is well known, Einstein’s insistence on the impor-
tance of measurement rods and clocks was the starting
point of Moritz Schlick’s attempt to provide a philosophi-
cal interpretation of General Relativity, exemplified in his
celebrated 1917 paper, published in two installments on
the semi-popular journal Die Naturwissenschaften (Schlick,
1917, tr. in Schlick, 1978, vol. I, 207-269). From Schlick’s
point of view Einstein’s approach could be considered the
heir to the discussion between Helmholtz and Poincaré on
the role of rigid bodies in the epistemology of geometry.
In particular, Schlick introduced here the main lines of
his conventionalism: the choice of the geometry of space
depends on which body one considers as rigid; but it is im-
possible to know which bodies are rigid without knowing
the geometry of space. One breaks the circle by regard-
ing as rigid those bodies from which the simplest physics
would result, that is, the physics that contain the least
arbitrary elements (Schlick, 1917, 167).
Of course Schlick was well aware that “the notion of
a rigid rod, which preserved the same length at all times,
no matter what its position and surroundings might be”
(Schlick, 1917, 182, tr. 1978, I, 238), “had already been
modified to a certain extent in the Special Theory of Rela-
tivity”, where “the condition was fulfilled”, only for “a rod
respectively at rest with regard to each system in question”
(Schlick, 1917, 182, tr. 1978, I, 239). In General Relativity
“the length of a rod . . . can also depend on its place and
its position”, so that the very possibility of measurements
was irremediably jeopardized (Schlick, 1917, 183, tr. 1978,
I, 244).
Schlick’s strategy to find a “δο´ς μοι piουˆ στωˆ” (Schlick,
1917, 183, tr. 1978, I, 244) to perform measurements
within a general relativistic context was of course to as-
sume, as Einstein did, that the behavior of rigid rods is Eu-
clidean (or Minkowskian in case of rods and clock) in small
domains — which, however, “may still be large compared
with the dimensions which are used elsewhere in physics”
(Schlick, 1917, 183, tr. 1978, I, 245). In small portions
of space-time, as Schlick points out, “[t]he ‘line-element’
has a direct physical meaning, and can be ascertained by
means of measuring-scales and clocks” (Schlick, 1917, 183,
tr. 1978, I, 245), independently of the coordinate system
used. It must then be assumed that the “the value which
we there obtain for ds is valid generally” (Schlick, 1917,
184, tr. 1978, I, 249), i.e. the line element ds has the same
length under all circumstances: “The numerical value of
ds is always the same, whatever orientation the chosen lo-
cal co-ordinate system may have” (Schlick, 1917, 183, tr.
1978, I, 245).
Schlick offers an accurate reconstruction of Einstein’s
own theory of measurement; its compatibility with Schlick’s
own conventionalism is, however, all but obvious. On
Schlick’s own account, the rigidity of small rods is not stip-
ulated: rigid are those rods and ideal are those clocks that
have a pseudo-Euclidean behavior; meaning those that can
be disposed to forming a rectangular grid in sufficiently
small regions of space-time (Torretti, 1983, 239f.). One
of these measuring devices can be set conventionally as
a unit rod, but this has nothing to do with the conven-
tional choice among different possible metrical geometries.
Changing the unit of measurement does not change the
metric of space but only multiplies all lengths by the same
scale factor. In Riemannian geometry, this factor is in fact
assumed to be constant, i.e. that ratio of the two units is
assumed to be the same whenever they are compared.
Schlick, who had been in correspondence with Einstein
since the late 1915, sent him a copy of his paper on the 4th
of February, 1917. Einstein replied on the 6th of Febru-
ary, 1917 praising Schlick’s paper unconditionally, espe-
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cially for its empiricist flavor (Howard, 1984; Hentschel,
1986). However, some days later (probably after the 15th
of February, 1917), Einstein wrote to his former Zurich
student Walter Dällenbach, stressing that, from an epis-
temological point of view, the idea that the ds could be
found directly through a measurement done by rigid rods
is not at all satisfying :
Dear Dällenbach! Your remarks are, in my opinion,
to a large extent correct.1 Strictly speaking, the
concept of ds2 volatilizes in an empty abstraction:
ds2 cannot be rigorously considered as the result
of measurements, not even in the absence of elec-
tromagnetic fields. You have rightly indicated the
reasons why it is so. Nevertheless, in a didactically
reasonable presentation of the theory the ds2 must
be so considered, as if it were rigorously measur-
able . . . A logically satisfying presentation can be
achieved (a posteriori), so that the a single, more
complex solution is related to the observed facts.
A measuring-rod would then be an atomic system
of a certain type that does not play any special
role in the theory (CPAE 8, Doc. 565, 803; my
emphasis)
A small rigid rod in astronomical proportions, let’s say a
rock-salt crystal, is a composite structure in atomically;
its rigidity results from the fixity of the spacing between
the chlorine and sodium atoms arranged in a cubic lattice,
maintained by electrical forces. Thus, rigid rods cannot be
considered as theoretically self-sufficient entities, but their
description involves quantum theoretical principles, whose
justification, however, lies outside the conceptual frame-
work of General Relativity. As Einstein admits, the behav-
ior of such an atomic structure, the fact that it preserves
its length wherever it is transported, should in principle
be justified within General Relativity, rather than serving
to connect it with the observed facts.
As the letter to Dällenbach reveals, Einstein’s repeated
insistence on measuring rods and clocks, far from repre-
senting the chief philosophical implications of the General
Relativity, as Schlick thought, was then a sort of provi-
sional and “didactic” compromise, a point on which, as
we have seen, Hilbert had also insisted nearly at the same
time. Dellänbach was at that time Weyl’s doctoral stu-
dent; his objection to Einstein probably reflects the dis-
cussions that he might have had with Weyl himself. In
1917, Weyl gave his famous lectures on relativity at the
ETH Zurich, which would appear as a book one year later
in 1918 with the title Raum-Zeit-Materie.
As is well known, in his presentation Weyl explicitly
tried to avoid the use of exceedingly complicated measur-
ing instruments, such as rods and clocks, for the measure-
ment of gik by restricting himself exclusively to the ob-
servation of the arrival of light signals; for instance, those
emitted by two stars, i.e. to measuring the angle between
1Einstein refers to a private conversation.
null geodesics (ds2 = 0) at a certain point. In this way,
however, the metric can be determined only up to an arbi-
trary scale factor (g′ik = λgik), which “can be determined
only through the individual choice of a unit of measure”
(Weyl, 1918c, 182). After determining the metric up to
a constant by the use of light rays, one can use rods and
clocks to determine the constant as well, by fixing a choice
of units for space-time distances. The constancy of λ as-
sures the comparability at a distance not only of the angles
among curves, but also of their lengths.
In a 1918 paper, Reine Infinitesimalgeometrie, Weyl
famously argued, however, against the necessity of this last
element of “geometry at a distance” (Weyl, 918s) which
still survives in Riemannian Geometry (form more details
cf.: Scholz, 2008, 2004; Ryckman, 2005; Bell and Korté,
2011). All intervals between close pairs of points can thus
be changed by the multiplication of an arbitrary factor λ,
which may be different in different locations. As is well
known, in a successive paper, Gravitation und Elektrizität
(Weyl, 1918b), Weyl suggested that, by removing such a
blemish in Riemannian geometry, in addition to the gµν
also the quantities φν appear, which could be identified
with the four potentials of the electromagnetic field (Weyl,
1918b).
As we have seen, in Einstein’s theory it is presup-
posed that if two cadmium atom clocks are separated and
brought together along different world-lines, they will still
tick at equal rates, but in general will show a “first or usual
clock effect”; from this they would then measure different
elapsed times, if one of them had passed through a grav-
itational field. Weyl’s theory would introduce a “second
clock effect”: If two cadmium atoms are separated and
brought back, the final size of the atoms might differ, the
spectral lines might be shifted, and thus would show dif-
ferent rates of ticking that would serve as an indicator of
the electromagnetic field (cf.: Vizgin, 1994; O’Raifeartaigh
and Straumann, 2000; Goenner, 2004, ch. 3; § 4.1).
Einstein was highly impressed by Weyl’s theory, but he
was unable to settle “the measuring-rod objection [Maßstab-
Einwand]” against it, which he communicated personally
to Weyl in March 1918 (CPAE 8, Doc. 510 and 512). In
a brief note published in an appendices to Weyl’s paper
(Einstein, 1918), Einstein famously argued that if Weyl’s
theory were true, “there could not be chemical elements
with spectral lines of determined frequencies”; rather, “the
relative frequencies of two spatially neighboring atoms of
the same kind should be, in general, different” (Einstein,
1918, 40). However, this is not the case. The relative con-
stancy of the frequency of atoms is then a plausible factual
assumption. As Weyl pointed out in his rejoinder to Ein-
stein, however, “the task remains, in my theory as well as
in Einstein’s, to derive this fact by the dynamics carried
through explicitly” (Weyl, 1918a, 479).
Writing to Einstein (after the 15th of June, 1918), Del-
länbach acknowledged that, if Weyl’s theory applied to re-
ality, “one would lose the connection with the observed
facts” (CPAE 8, Doc. 565, 803); however, in order to as-
6
sure this connection, Einstein had assumed “too complex
things as rigid bodies or clocks” (CPAE 8, Doc. 565, 803)
while being unable to explain their behavior. Einstein’s
reply is interesting throughout:
If then two ds at distant points were measured with
measuring rods or, in a certain way, were found to
be equal, they would still be found equal, if they
were measured in a different way. This is a deep
property of our world, which must find expression
in the foundation of physics. . . I know that Weyl
does not admit it. He would say that clocks and
measuring-rods must appear as solutions; they do
not occur in the foundation of the theory. But
I find: if the ds is measured by a clock (or a
measuring-rod), is something independent of pre-
history, construction and the material, then this
invariant as such must also play a fundamental role
in the theory. Yet, if the manner in which nature
really behaves would be otherwise, then spectral
lines and well-defined chemical elements would not
exist (CPAE 8, Doc. 565, 803; my emphasis)
In other words, Einstein could only acknowledge a res facti,
that we happen to live in a world in which the relative
periods of clocks and the relative lengths of rods do not
depend on their histories. Weyl, on the contrary, was rais-
ing a questio iuris by asking that the behaviors of such
complicated material structures, such as rods and clocks,
should be considered as a solution to the equations of the
theory; (in Einstein’s as well as in his own theory), that
is, it should be deduced from some dynamical theory of
matter (cf. Weyl, 1919, 260).
Following this line of thought by 1920 (Weyl, 1920),
at the Meeting of Natural Scientists in Bad Nauheim (19-
25 September 1920), Weyl had started to account for the
apparent constancy of frequency of atoms by distinguish-
ing between a “tendency of persistence” (Beharrungsten-
denz) or “adjustment” (Einstellung) (Weyl, 1920, 649).
Roughly, Weyl suggested that cadmium atoms do not pre-
serve their size if transported, but they adjust it every
time to the radius of the spherical curvature of every three-
dimensional section of world (Weyl, 1920, 650). Similarly,
a magnetic needle always adjusts its direction to the north
in the earth’s magnetic field and does not preserve it.
In the discussion which followed Weyl’s paper, Einstein
insisted, however, that in his theory “[t]emporal-spatial
intervals are physically defined with the help of measur-
ing rods and clocks” (Einstein reply to Weyl, 1920, 650),
whose “equality is empirically independent of their prehis-
tory”. This presupposition — he argued — assures “the
possibility of coordinating [zuzuordnen] a number, ds, to
two neighboring points” (Einstein’s reply to Weyl, 1920,
650). Renouncing this “coordination [Zuordnung]” would
rob “the theory of its most solid empirical support and pos-
sibilities of confirmation” (Einstein’s reply to Weyl, 1920,
650).
These and similar expressions were, of course, music to
the Logical Empiricists’ ears. However, Einstein, in the
same Bad Nauheim meeting, by addressing other inter-
locutors, assumed a quite different stance. For instance,
when discussing Max von Laue’s paper on the gravita-
tional redshift, Einstein defined, “the fact that measuring-
rods and clocks have to be introduced separately, instead
of being constructed as solutions of differential equations”
as “[a] logical weakness of the theory in the today state”
(Einstein’s reply to Laue, 1920, 652).
4. The Emergence of Logical Empiricism as a Mis-
understanding of Einstein’s Philosophy of Ge-
ometry
4.1. Reichenbach’s Objections to Schlick’s Conventional-
ism
Unaware of this complex dialogical background, in 1917
Schlick had, after all, very good reasons to emphasize the
fundamental role that rods and clocks played in General
Relativity. As Einstein wrote in a letter to Cassirer in June
1920: “The destiny of General Relativity as a physical
theory depends entirely upon the interpretation of the ds
as result of measurement, which can be obtained in a quite
definite way through measuring-rods and clocks” (CPAE
10, Doc. 44, 293). Schlick could then legitimately interpret
Einstein’s language of coordination as a confirmation of
his own philosophical approach, which in the meantime
had been presented in a systematic form in the first 1918
edition of the Allgemeine Erkenntnisslehre (Schlick, 1918),
a book which, as we shall see, was to have a considerable
influence on Einstein himself.
More puzzling is the fact that Schlick could believe
that Einstein’s insistence on the the direct measurabil-
ity of the ds was compatible with a form of convention-
alism à la Poincaré. The impossibility of carrying out
such a program is explained very neatly in Reichenbach’s
1920 “Kantian” monograph on relativity, Relativitätstheo-
rie und Erkenntnis apriori (Reichenbach, 1920)
As is well known, according to the young Reichenbach,
who had been one of the five students in Einstein’s first
seminar on General Relativity, conventionalism works only
for spaces of constant curvature (Friedman, 1995). In each
of these spaces there is a unique (up to a constant positive
factor — i.e. up to the choice of a “unit of length”) set of
congruence relations so that each such set of congruence
relations is inconsistent with any other set. Conventional-
ism is then based precisely on the idea that one can make
an arbitrary choice among one of these incompatible sets.
In Riemannian geometry of variable curvature, no unique
set of congruence relations can be defined over all the
space, so the very idea of a unique conventional choice
among alternative congruent relations does not make sense.
For this reason, Reichenbach points out, Poincaré “ex-
cludes from the beginning Riemannian geometry, because
it does not permit the displacement of a body without
change of form” (Reichenbach, 1920, 104, n. 1; tr. 1965,
109, 1; translation modified). In the general case only
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the unit of length is globally available on a Riemannian
manifold, in contrast to Weyl’s non-Riemannian geometry
where a separate unit of length at every point of space may
be defined.
What characterizes Einstein-Riemann-geometry then
is the possibility of comparing small measuring rods at
a distance. As Reichenbach points out, “Weyl’s gener-
alization of the theory of relativity . . . abandons alto-
gether the concept of a definite length for an infinitely
small measuring-rod” (Reichenbach, 1920, 73; tr. 1965,
76), that is, it drops the hypothesis of global availability
of the linear unit of measure. Reichenbach correctly ob-
serves that “[i]f, for instance, Weyl’s generalization should
turn out to be correct . . . [t]hen the comparison of two
small measuring rods at two different space points would
also no longer contain the objective relation that it contains
in Einstein’s theory” (Reichenbach, 1920, 87; tr. 1965, 91;
translation modified).
Reichenbach did not hide his reservations towardWeyl’s
idea “that mathematics and physics are but one discipline”
(Reichenbach, 1920, 73; tr. 1965, 76); however, he had all
the elements to understand that Schlick’s attempt to save
conventionalism by shifting the attention from rigid bod-
ies to infinitesimal rigid rods simply misses the point. In
Riemannian geometry, the choice of the unit rod or of the
unit clock is of course arbitrary, but the ratio of the units
is constant all over the manifold. This is a matter of fact
and not of convention.
In the years between 1920 and 1929 Reichenbach played
a fundamental role in defending and popularizing Ein-
stein’s theories (Hentschel, 1982), at the same time ac-
quiring an admirable technical knowledge of their mathe-
matical apparatus. Surprisingly, however, probably under
the influence of Schlick, he abandoned his very convincing
critique of geometrical conventionalism.
After an opportunity to have a first look at Reichen-
bach’s book, Schlick immediately wrote to Einstein: “Re-
ichenbach does not seem to me to be fair [nicht gerecht
zu sein] toward Poincaré’s conventionalism [Konvention-
slehre]” (Schlick an Einstein, 9.10.1920; CPAE 10, Doc.
171). Writing to Reichenbach some weeks later, Schlick
tried to debunk Reichenbach’s critique of conventionalism,
arguing (erroneously) that Poincaré in his later writings
included geometries of variable curvature in his approach
(Reichenbach to Schlick 26.11.1920; Schlick and Reichen-
bach, 22).
Reichenbach answered, agreeing on Schlick’s “and Ein-
stein’s point of view” [und Einsteins Standpunkt] that in
principle one could choose between keeping relativity and
abandoning Euclidean geometry or vice versa: “physics,
however, makes the first decision . . . you, and Poincaré,
would say for the sake of simplicity [um der Einfachheit
halber] . . . But I have an instinctive refusal against this in-
terpretation” (Reichenbach to Schlick 29.11.1920; Schlick
and Reichenbach, 22). As is well known, Reichenbach very
rapidly overcame his “instinctive disinclination” toward
conventionalism, a fact that still puzzles historians (on this
point see: Parrini, 2005). In the following years Reichen-
bach would describe Einstein’s epistemological achieve-
ment precisely as the discovery that would have made it
possible in principle for physics to make the second de-
cision, that is, to get rid of non-Euclidean geometry by
preserving gravitation as a real force.
4.2. Einstein’s Geometrie und Erfahrung
The publication of the expanded form of Einstein’s
1921 lecture Geometrie und Erfahrung (Einstein, 1921, tr.
in Einstein, 1954, 232-246) probably played a major role
in Reichenbach’s “conversion”. In the lecture, Einstein re-
ferred explicitly to Schlick’s book on the theory of knowl-
edge (Schlick, 1918), which he had read during a journey
to Holland in October 1919 (cf. Howard, 1984, 620).
Following Schlick’s method of implicit definitions (Schlick,
1918, §7), Einstein distinguishes between “purely axiomatic
geometry” and “practical geometry”, which “contains af-
firmations as to the relations of practically-rigid bodies”
(Einstein, 1921, 6; tr. 1954, 235). Einstein even claims
that, if “this view of geometry” as a “branch of physics”,
“had not served as a stepping-stone”, he “should have been
unable to formulate the theory of relativity” (Einstein,
1921, 6f.; tr. 1954, 235).
Einstein, however, famously recognized that Poincaré
was “sub specie aeterni” right (Einstein, 1921, 8; tr. 1954,
236) when he denied that the physical behavior of rigid
bodies can be used to establish whether the abstract ge-
ometry (G) is true or false; in principle it is always possible
to make rigid bodies agree with any kind of geometry we
please by changing the physical laws (P ) that govern their
behavior. Only the sum G + P , geometry plus physics,
can be compared with experience (Einstein, 1921, 7-8; tr.
1954, 236).
The reference to Poincaré is at first sight quite puz-
zling. The concept of “rigid body” which lies at the basis
of his philosophy of geometry is already quite problematic
in Special Relativity, and becomes completely useless in a
space of variable curvature, such as that of General Rela-
tivity (Friedman, 2002). Einstein was of course referring
to “practical infinitesimal rigid rods [praktisch unendlich
kleinen Massstabe]” (CPAE 7, Doc. 31, 271).
General Relativity presupposes that, if two of these
rods “are found to be equal”, i.e. have the same length,
“once and anywhere, they are equal always and every-
where” (Einstein, 1921, 9; tr. 1954, 237). The same as-
sumption must be made for clocks, that “when going at the
same rate” in some place and time, “they will always go at
the same rate, no matter where and when they are again
compared with each other” (Einstein, 1921, 9f.; tr. 1954,
238) The name of Weyl is not explicitly mentioned by Ein-
stein. However, Einstein’s argument to support this claim
is only a thinly veiled allusion to the “measuring-rod ob-
jection” against him: “The existence of sharp spectral lines
— Einstein writes — is a convincing experimental proof
of the above-mentioned principle of practical geometry”
(Einstein, 1921, 9; tr. 1954, 238; my emphasis)
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Thus the reference to Poincaré in Einstein’s Geometrie
und Erfahrung has nothing to do with the classical prob-
lem of choosing among Euclidean and non-Euclidean sorts
of Riemannian geometries. On the contrary, the very na-
ture of Riemannian (or pseudo-Riemannian) geometry is
at stake. The transportability of small measuring rods and
atomic clocks — the fact that their relative lengths and
rates are independent of their position — “is the ultimate
foundation . . . which enables us to speak with meaning of
a metric in Riemann’s sense of the word” (Einstein, 1921,
11; tr. 1954, 238; my emphasis).
As Einstein noticed in a note to an unpublished arti-
cle intended for “Nature” (Grundgedanken und Methoden
der Relativitätstheorie, in ihrer Entwicklung dargestellt,
1920), “this sort of equality” between rods and clocks, “an
endurable, independent from the motion-prehistory [eine
dauernde, von der Bewegungsvorgeschichte unabhängige],
is “a crucial [massgebende] presupposition of the entire
theory” (CPAE 7, Doc. 31, 280). Einstein accepted such a
presupposition as an empirical fact that small rods of equal
length will remain so after arbitrary separation. Weyl
could however object that such a behavior could not be
directly read off from observations, since two equal mea-
suring rods, because of the influence of temperature, ex-
ternal forces etc., will likely not have the same length when
reunited; Einstein’s alleged fact was no more than an ar-
bitrary stipulation.
With a little good will one can glimpse here some vague
resemblance to Poincaré’s conventionalist arguments against
Helmholtz’s empiricism. Poincaré was ready to “save” Eu-
clidean geometry (G), by changing the laws of physics (P );
Weyl claimed that it was always possible to maintain a
non-Riemannian “aether-geometry” [Äthergeometrie], by
blaming the “body-geometry” [Körpergeometrie] (Weyl,
1921a, 232) — the empirically observed Riemannian be-
havior of rods and clocks — on the physical mechanism
of “adjustment”. From this point of view, as Weyl put it
in the 1921 edition of Raum-Zeit-Materie, geometry and
physics “form an inseparable unity, something that should
be kept in sight always as a whole” (Weyl, 1921c, 60).
The interpretation of Geometrie und Erfahrung is then
a paradigmatic case where Beller’s “dialogical” approach
turns out to be indispensable. The text is easily misun-
derstood if one does not bear in mind that Einstein, in
referring to Poincaré, was actually addressing Weyl’s epis-
temological question without mentioning him (cf. Ryck-
man, 2005, §3.5).
It is instructive to pay attention to Einstein’s phras-
ing. According to Einstein, Poincaré was sub specie aeterni
right for the following reason: he had shown that solid bod-
ies and clocks are not “irreducible elements” but “compos-
ite structures”, which must “not play any independent part
in theoretical physics” (Einstein, 1921, 8; tr. 1954, 236; my
empahsis); in principle they should be constructed “theo-
retically from elementary concepts”. However, according
to Einstein, “in the present stage of development of the-
oretical physics” this is not possible, and “these concepts
must still be employed as independent concepts” (Einstein,
1921, 8; tr. 1954, 237; my empahsis)
These are of course exactly the alternative attitudes
toward the role of rods and clocks in General Relativity
that Einstein, Weyl and Dällenbach had debated in public
writings and in private correspondence some years earlier.
Weyl still insisted on this point in a 1921 paper: Ein-
stein’s “measure-determination . . . with help from mea-
suring rods and clocks” can be accepted only to assure “a
preliminary connection to experience”; in principle, how-
ever, the transportability (or non transportability) of rods
and clocks should be regarded “as consequences of the de-
veloped theory” (Weyl, 1921b, 259-260).
In a paper published in the same year — addressing Re-
ichenbach’s 1920 critique directly — Weyl seems to regard
precisely this point as the major “philosophical” implica-
tion of his attempt to unify gravitation and electricity (cf.
Rynasiewicz, 2005):
From different sides,2 it has been argued against
my theory, that it would attempt to demonstrate
in a purely speculative way something a priori
about matters on which only experience can ac-
tually decide. This is a misunderstanding. Of
course from the epistemological principle [aus dem
erkenntnistheoretischen Prinzip] of the relativity
of magnitude does not follow that the “tract” dis-
placement [Streckenübertragung] through “congru-
ent displacement” [durch kongruente Verpflanzung]
is not integrable; from the principle that no fact
can be derived. The principle only teaches that
the integrability per se must not be retained, but,
if it is realized, it must be understood as the out-
flow [Ausfluß] of a law of nature (Weyl, 1921a, 475;
last emphasis mine).
Weyl clears the ground of possible misunderstandings; his
theory intended only to show that Einstein’s assumption
about the existence of rigid infinitesimal rods and ideal
clocks is not logically necessary, but only a factual claim
that General Relativity should be able to justify. There
is little doubt that Einstein, in his 1921 lecture, was ad-
dressing precisely this challenge of Weyl’s, recognizing it
as inescapable sub specie aeternitatis, even if impossible to
overcome sub specie temporis.
4.3. A Parting of the Ways: Schlick’s and Reichenbach’s
Misunderstanding of Einstein’s Epistemology of Ge-
ometry
Isolated from the background of the dialogue withWeyl,
Geometrie und Erfahrung seemed to confirm Schlick’s phi-
losophy of geometry beyond every hope. Not only did Ein-
stein explicitly mention Schlick’s 1918 book, but he also
referred explicitly to Poincaré, apparently interpreting his
own theory in the light of the 19th century debate about
geometry. Schlick’s famous Erläuterungen to Helmholtz’s
2The reference is to Reichenbach, 1920 and Freundlich, 1920
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writing on geometry (Helmholtz, 1921) show how easily
Einstein’s formula G+P could be integrated with Schlick’s
own conventionalism. Einstein had somehow reconciled
the Helmholtz-Poincaré antithesis with a sort of Hegelian
synthesis: one can determine the geometry of space em-
pirically by assuming the conventional definition of rigid-
ity of bodies that leads to the simplest physics (see e.g.
Helmholtz, 1921, Schlcik’s note 31).
In his recension of Einstein’s Geometrie und Erfahrung,
published on June, 3th 1921 on Die Naturwissenschaften,
Schlick seems however to be aware that there was another
problem about which Einstein was concerned:
It has been often noticed that there is no simple
compelling reason to choose some physical bodies
[Naturkörper] as rigid; we could use an arbitrary
[beliebiges] system of geometry for the description
of reality, if only we are ready to change at the
same time the system of physics; only the totality,
geometry plus physics, is determined forcefully by
experience. Einstein recognizes the in principle ir-
refutable validity of this conception; however just
as Poincaré admitted, that the economy of science
forces us to choose, without hesitation, a deter-
minate geometry (even if he thought it was the
Euclidean one); similarly for Einstein in today’s
state of development of physics, it is inevitable to
use [zugrunde zu legen] empirical physical bodies
[Naturkörper] with determinate properties as rigid
measuring rods in the measurement of the displace-
ment possibilities [Lagerungsmöglichkeiten]; one should
use those bodies which satisfy that condition —
which can be confirmed by the experience — that
two measuring rods are always and overall equally
long, if they once and somewhere were found as
equal (a condition, which Weyl, as well-known,
had tried to drop). Under this condition the ax-
ioms of practical geometry are pure empirical sen-
tences that can be communicated through obser-
vation (Schlick, 1921, 435; my emphasis).
Schlick, of course, could appreciate Einstein’s refinement
of Poincaré’s “economical” procedure of making an, in
principle, arbitrary decision about which rods are rigid.
However, by the end of the passage, Schlick also makes a
more subtle point. He remarks that such rods must sat-
isfy a “condition” (the ratio of the lengths of two rods
is the same whenever they are compared) that it is “con-
firmed by experience”, even if Weyl has “tried to drop it”.
Thus Schlick was aware of Einstein’s measuring rod ob-
jection. Surprisingly, however, he did not seem to realize
that precisely the epistemological status of this “condi-
tion” (whether it is only “confirmed by experience”, or if
it should be “derived from the theory”), was Einstein’s
main epistemological concern.
After all, Einstein mentions Schlick’s own book at the
very beginning of the Geometrie und Erfahrung, but does
not mention the name of Weyl. Schlick could then have the
legitimate impression that Einstein was pursuing a simi-
lar “Poincaréian” agenda, revolved on the classical prob-
lem of the choice among Euclidean and non-Euclidean ge-
ometry. This misunderstanding can be appreciated even
more clearly if one considers the following passage of Re-
ichenbach’s review article on philosophical interpretations
of Relativity published in the same year:
[1]We have mentioned above, that the congruence
of two tracts can be defined through transporta-
tion of a natural measuring-rod; however this is of
course only a definition. It could also be defined
in another way; for instance, a measuring rod af-
ter two juxtapositions becomes 1/2 of its original
length, after three 1/3 etc. One obtains then a Rie-
mannian geometry of different measuring-determination
[Maßbestimmung]. The “change” of the measuring
rods can in this case be interpreted as an effect of
force, that in this way it is introduced in the def-
inition [hinzudefiniert] [of a rigid rod]. Depending
on the choice of the field of force, one gets a dif-
ferent geometry. For this reason material objects
[materiellen Gebilde] do not define a single geom-
etry, but a class of geometries; this is precisely the
meaning of conventionalism. [2]However one must
consider, that this class of geometries is in turn not
arbitrary, but their validity is based on an axiom,
that denotes an empirical fact [einen empirischen
Tatbestand]; it is the assumption that two natural
measuring rods, which can be brought to superpo-
sition once [die sich einmal zur Deckung bringen
lassen], can be superposed again after they have
been transported along different paths. In the va-
lidity of this axiom — we want to call it the axiom
of the class of Riemannian geometries — lies an in-
variant characteristic of the possible geometry ac-
cording to Einstein (Reichenbach, 1921, 365-366)
This passage is in my opinion extremely significant and
deserves a careful reading. It shows precisely the point
where Einstein and Logical Empiricists came to a misun-
derstanding:
[1] In the first part of the quote, Reichenbach refers to the
classical problem of the choice among possible Rie-
mannian geometries with different measure determi-
nations. By arguing that a non-Euclidean geometry
is equivalent to a Euclidean geometry with a field of
universal forces, Reichenbach shows that the choice
is arbitrary. This was the original problem discussed
by Helmholtz and Poincaré, and adapted by Schlick
in the new general-relativistic context: “According
to the theory of relativity, the choice of a geometry
is arbitrary; but it is no longer arbitrary once con-
gruence has been defined by means of rigid bodies”
(Reichenbach, 1921, 360; 1978, I, 38).
[2] In the second part of the passage, however, Reichen-
bach makes a different and, for our goals, more im-
portant consideration. Reichenbach notices that all
Riemannian geometries (Euclidean or non-Euclidean)
share a common property: they all presuppose that
two measuring rods of the same length remain so if
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separated and brought together again. As Reichen-
bach correctly notices, this “axiom” — actually an
empirical fact — defines the entire class of Rieman-
nian geometries, that is of the “possible geometries
according to Einstein”.
It is not exaggerated to claim that here we have come to a
sort of a parting of the ways: Reichenbach, in subsequent
years, will base his philosophical interpretation of General
Relativity on the conviction that Einstein was mainly con-
cerned with problem [1]. It is not by chance that, still in
the 1978 English translation of Reichenbach’s paper, the
pages on Weyl’s theory were simply omitted as “of no his-
torical importance” (Reichenbach, 1978, 38). However, as
we have seen, it was precisely problem [2] which Einstein
was addressing.
It must be emphasized that Reichenbach understood
perfectly well the epistemological implications of Weyl’s
theory; he simply did not recognize them as the central
issue of Einstein’s reflections on geometry. Reichenbach
in fact took back his previous objection “that Weyl wants
to deduce physics from Reason, since Weyl has cleared up
this misunderstanding” (Reichenbach, 1921, 367; the ref-
erence is to Weyl 1921a, 475). He had come to realize that
Weyl did not want to impose on nature his purely infinites-
imal geometry, but rather show that the transportability
of rods and clocks — uncritically assumed by Einstein —
is actually not logically necessary:
Weyl took exception to the fact, that Einstein has
simply condoned [einfach hingenommen] the uni-
vocal transportability of natural measuring-rods
[eindeutigen Uebertragbarkeit natürlicher Maßstäbe].
He does not want to dispute the axiom of the
Riemannian class for natural measuring rods; he
wants only to urge that the validity of this axiom,
being not logically necessary, “is understood as an
outflow [Ausfluß] of a law of nature”. I can only
agree with this demand [Forderung]; it is the mean-
ing of mathematics, that, by discovering more gen-
eral possibilities, reveals the contingency of certain
facts of experience [speziellen Tatbestände der Er-
fahrung als speziell kennzeichnet] and thus save
Physics from simplification [Simplizität]. Admit-
tedly, Weyl was able to explain the univocal trans-
portability of natural measuring-rods only in a very
incomplete way. But the only fact that he had tried
to follow this path, regardless of its empirical cor-
rectness, was a genial advance [genialer Vorstoß] in
the philosophical foundation of physics (Reichen-
bach, 1921, 367f.).
Here, Reichenbach sees the point clearly: Einstein as-
sumed the Riemannian idea of measurement as a simple
fact (einfach hingenommen): the “univocal transportabil-
ity of natural measuring-rods” is an independent hypoth-
esis which must be presupposed to assure the comparabil-
ity of the predictions of the theory with reality. Weyl,
by showing that another class of geometries where this as-
sumption is dropped would be equally possible, had rightly
asked for an explanation: the “univocal transportability of
natural measuring-rods” must be derived from the theory
— it must be a consequence of it.
Reichenbach provides an admirable presentation of the
Weyl-Einstein controversy: Einstein’s de facto Rieman-
nian assumption vs. Weyl’s requirement of its de iure jus-
tification in front of an equally feasible non Riemannian-
alternative. What Reichenbach seems to have missed is the
fact that Einstein, by referring to Poincaré in his 1921 lec-
ture, was addressing precisely this issue and not supporting
a form of conventionalism à la Schlick. The original prob-
lem discussed by Poincaré, namely the choice within the
class of possible Riemannian geometries was not at stake
at all.
On the contrary, Reichenbach reneges his previous opin-
ion that “the metric . . . expresses an objective property of
reality” and insists that “[t]his conception does not contra-
dict conventionalism”, which for Reichenbach is evidently
implied in Einstein’s formula G + P : “Schlick must not
be interpreted as saying that a certain metric has been
prescribed; a metric emerges only after the physical laws
have been established (the P of Einstein’s formula). One
can also change the metric, provided one changes the laws
of physics correspondingly” (Reichenbach, 1921, 356; tr.
1878, I, 34f.; my emphasis).
4.4. Getting off Track: The Implementation of Reichen-
bach’s Conventionalism
Reichenbach’s 1922 paper, La signification philosophique
de la théorie de la relativité (Reichenbach, 1922), the first
comprehensive presentation of his new conventionalist ap-
proach to geometry and relativity, shows clearly that he,
in the wake of Schlick, had come to interpret Einstein’s
reference to Poincaré, so to say, “literally”: “The solu-
tion to the problem of space is therefore found only in
this conception we call conventionalism, which goes back
to Helmholtz and Poincaré” (Reichenbach, 1922, 40; tr.
2006; 135). The central problem for Reichenbach is pre-
cisely how to choose among different possible Riemannian
geometries.
By introducing the idea of a non-detectable force of
type X, such as gravitation, which causes uniform shrink-
ages and expansions in all materials, Reichenbach con-
cludes that the main philosophical lesson of General Rel-
ativity is the following: “[t]he definition of congruence is
. . . arbitrary, and what is congruent in one geometry is
not necessarily congruent in another” (Reichenbach, 1922,
33; tr. 2006; 127; my emphasis). It is worth noticing that
Reichenbach makes an important remark here, although
in passing: “This definition of congruence is arbitrary, but
it is uni-vocal, and it entails that two rigid rods that are
congruent at a point remain congruent at all points. This
is an axiom that we can consider to be experimentally well
confirmed” (Reichenbach, 1922, 35; tr. 2006; 129; my em-
phasis).
Reichenbach thus addresses the issue again that the
univocality of the definition of “congruence” as such is only
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an experimental, and not a logical, truth. A non-univocal
definition of congruence would be in principle legitimate:
“This is the path that Weyl followed with perfect rigor; it
cannot be said that a rod is equal in an absolute sense to
one at another place, but that we can dispose altogether
with the arbitrary process of the comparison of rods” (Re-
ichenbach, 1922, 41; tr. 2006; 136).
Reichenbach seems here to confuse different issues. There
is actually no univocal definition of congruence of bodies in
Riemannian manifolds of variable curvature, as Reichen-
bach himself had rightly noticed in 1920. In such spaces,
in fact, the congruence of bodies is not independent of po-
sition: two plane figures which are congruent on the equa-
tor of an egg-shaped surface cannot be reproduced at the
pole. In all Riemannian manifolds, however, there is an ar-
bitrary, but univocal definition of the unit of length: two
small rods of equal lengths in a place will still have the
same length wherever they are compared.
The fact that the univocality of the definition of a unit
of length was only “experimentally well confirmed” was
precisely Einstein’s main and only epistemological con-
cern that emerged in the discussion of Weyl. The fact
that Reichenbach did not appreciate this point is noth-
ing but stunning. Reichenbach, in fact, explains it with
usual accuracy in his more technical 1924 Axiomatik der
relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1924, tr.
Reichenbach, 1969).
As we have seen, using light rays ds2 = 0, one can de-
termine the value of gµν up to a scale factor: “then every
metric g′µνwhich results from gµν through multiplication
by a scalar field λ(x1, ..., x4) will satisfy these axioms, since
in it the lines ds2 = 0 satisfy the same equation” (Reichen-
bach, 1924, 120; tr. 1969, 151). As Reichenbach notices, if
“the light geometry furnishes only the quotient gµνg′µν = qµν ,
then “[f]or the determination of the absolute values of the
gµν in the gravitational field, however, we need material
things, either natural clocks or rigid rods” (Reichenbach,
1924, 122; tr. 1969, 170).
Thus Reichenbach shows very clearly that we need rods
and clocks only in order to force the parameter λ to be
constant:
One can now imagine the construction of the met-
ric gµν . If any coordinate system K is given for the
world, then point events of the distance ds2 = +1,
ds2 = 0, ds2 = −1 can be produced by means
of rigid rods and clocks permanently at rest in K.
The world will thus be interspersed with unit mesh
points. The functions gµν are to be determined
in such a way that with the chosen coordinates
ds = ±1 or 0, respectively, for all mesh points.
If merely the quotients qµν are to be constructed,
light signals alone suffice. . . . Only in order to
make the unit of length (or the unit of time) of the
various systems K′ equal are transportable rigid
rods (or clocks) needed. The significance of ma-
terial things becomes clear: they bring about a
comparison of the units at different points. This
comparison cannot be achieved by means of light
signals; for all other purposes light is sufficient (Re-
ichenbach, 1924, 120; tr. 1969, 151; my emphasis)
Thus Reichenbach is completely clear about the fact that
only in order to assure the reproducibility of the unit of
length we need the rigid rods and clocks. If the ratios of the
gµν is determined by using light signals, then clocks and
rods serve to determine the factor λ. The requirement that
two small rigid rods are congruent at a point and remain
congruent at all points is identical to the assumption that
scale factor λ is constant. This property characterizes the
class of Riemannian geometries as such and says nothing
about the possibility of making a choice within this class.
As we have seen, the ratio of two of such small rods —
and therefore also their ratio = 1, their equality — is an
absolute constant in General Relativity, and thus it is not
subjected to any conventional stipulation.
The relevant epistemological problem Einstein was forced
to consider after his debate with Weyl was precisely that
of the status of such a transportability of rods and clocks
in General Relativity. Again one has only to follow Re-
ichenbach’s exposition:
The word “adjustment” used by Weyl for the first
time in this context characterizes the problem very
well. It cannot be an accident that two measuring
rods are equal at every place in a neighborhood
comparison; this fact must be explained as an ad-
justment to the field in which the measuring rods
are embedded like test bodies. Just as the com-
pass needle adjusts itself to the magnetic field of
its immediate environment, even though merely in
its direction, so measuring rods and clocks adjust
their unit lengths to the metrical field. The met-
rical relations between material objects must be
explained in this fashion. The answer can be given
only by a detailed theory of matter of which noth-
ing is known until now. (Reichenbach, 1924, 64;
tr. 1969, 91; my emphasis)
Here, once again, Reichenbach explains the vexed question
eloquently: “it cannot be an accident that two measuring
rods are equal at every place in a neighborhood compari-
son”; Weyl had therefore required “this fact must be ex-
plained”. Precisely like Einstein, however, Reichenbach
claims that we do not have a “detailed theory of matter”
from which one can deduce such a behavior of our rods.
It is thus almost incomprehensible that Reichenbach failed
once again to realize that Einstein, in his 1921 lecture, was
addressing this issue exactly and not renewing the em-
piricism/conventionalism debate between Helmholtz and
Poincaré.
4.5. Einstein’s Reflections on Philosophy of Geometry be-
tween 1923 and 1926
Schlick’s 1925 second edition of his Allgemeine Erken-
ntnislehre confirms even more clearly that the reading of
Einstein’s lecture on the background of the Helmholtz-
Poincaré controversy prevailed among Logical Empiricists
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(Schlick, 1925, 326). Einstein’s reflections on geometry
published at about the same time, however, clearly suggest
that Einstein’s reference to 19th century conventionalism
cannot be interpreted literally, but have to be inserted in
its proper “dialogical” context.
In his delayed lecture for his 1921-22 Nobel prize de-
livered to the Nordic Assembly of Naturalists at Gothen-
burg in July 1923 Einstein had famously insisted that, as
composite atomic systems, rigid bodies cannot be used to
verify the laws of nature, for these very same laws should
in principle account for their rigidity (D’Agostino, 2000,
241f.). According to Einstein, “it would be logically more
correct to begin with the whole of the laws” (Einstein,
1923, 3; my emphasis) and not with an “artificially iso-
lated part” such as rods and clocks (Einstein, 1923, 3; my
emphasis).
In a 1924 recension (Einstein, 1924b) of a book by a mi-
nor Neo-kantian, Adolf Elsbach (Elsbach, 1924), to which
attention has been drawn recently (Howard, 1990, 2010),
Einstein distinguishes two different “standpoints” on the
question of “whether one grants reality to the practically-
rigid body”: according to Standpoint A, geometry “con-
tains assertions about possible experiments”; on the con-
trary, according to Standpoint B, “only geometry with
physical sciences taken together” can be compared with
experience (Einstein, 1924b, 1690f.). It is not hard to
see here once again the opposition between Einstein’s and
Weyl’s epistemological stance.
Even more important, in a paper published one year
later, Nichteuklidische Geometrie und Physik (Einstein,
1925), Einstein expressly attributed standpointA to Poincaré,
whereas standpoint B to Helmholtz:
In order to see the matter clearly, one must con-
sistently adopt one of two points of view. [A] In
the first, one holds that the “body” of geometry
is realized in principle by rigid bodies in nature,
provided that certain conditions are met regard-
ing temperature, mechanical strain, etc.; this is
the point of view of the practical physicist. In
this case, the “distance” of geometry agrees with a
natural object and thereby all propositions of ge-
ometry gain the character of assertions about real
bodies. This point of view was especially clearly
advocated by Helmholtz, and we can add that with-
out him the formulation of relativity theory would
have been practically impossible. [B] In the other
point of view, one denies in principle the exis-
tence of objects that agree with the fundamen-
tal concepts of geometry. Then geometry by itself
would include no assertions about objects of re-
ality, only geometry taken together with physics.
This point of view, which may more complete for
the systematic representation of a finished physics,
was expounded particularly clearly by Poincaré,
from this standpoint, the entire content of geom-
etry is conventional; which geometry is preferable
depends on how “simple” physics can be made by
using geometry to agree with experience (Einstein,
1925, 253, tr. in Pesic, 2007, 161)
Again Einstein is evidently not referring to finite rigid
bodies here; in a space of variable curvature “the possi-
ble contact-displacements [Berührungslagerungen] of prac-
tically rigid bodies would be different in different cases,
conditioned by the influence of the circumstances [Milieu-
Einflüssen]” (Einstein, 1924a, 86); there is no unique set
of congruence relations, so that it would not make sense
to decide once and for all which tiles of space are con-
gruent, as Helmholtz’s and Poincaré’s philosophy of ge-
ometry would require. Einstein is referring, of course, to
the “the possible disposition of infinitely many, infinitely
small rigid bodies [Lagerungsmöglichkeiten für unendlich
viel unendlich kleine starre Körper]” (Einstein, 1925, 253,
tr. in Pesic, 2007, 161). The local Euclidean behavior of
such rods cannot be extended “over finite regions” of space
(Einstein, 1925, 253, tr. in Pesic, 2007, 161), at least if we
attribute the same length to one of such rods in all posi-
tions and in every orientation.
Einstein’s reference to Helmholtz and Poincaré, then,
is nothing more then a “rhetorical device” which actu-
ally serves to address Weyl’s challenge. Einstein adopted
the “Helmholtzian” standpoint A, accepting provisionally
as an independent fact that there are rigid infinitesimal
rods, whose length would be the same under all circum-
stances. Weyl followed a “Poincaréan” standpoint B, by
arguing that such a behavior of infinitesimal rods cannot
be observed, but it is at most a convenient stipulation.
The problem with which Einstein was concerned was
then completely detached from the historical dialogue be-
tween Helmholtz and Poincaré, whose names are used as
mere labels to identify two abstract philosophical posi-
tions: “consistent thinkers — as Einstein put it in the
entry “space-time” for the 13th 1926 edition of the Ency-
clopedia Britannica — considered it preferable to allow the
content of experience [Erfahrungsbestände] to correspond
to geometry and physics conjointly” (Einstein, 1926, 609).
Einstein, however, is still convinced that “it would not be
advisable to give up the first view, from which geometry
derives its origin” — i.e. the interpretation of geometry as
science of the behavior of rigid bodies —, “an abstraction
that is well rooted in the laws of nature” (Einstein, 1926,
609).
Logical Empiricists not only failed to appreciate that
Einstein supported standpoint A only provisionally — as
it is usually claimed in literature. They never understood
the very problem to which the alternative referred: the
reproducibility vs. “not-reproducibility of the gauge-unit
[Nichtreproduzierbarkeit der Eicheinheit]”, as Fritz Lon-
don put it (London, 1927, 187). Weyl’s theory at that
time was losing most of its convincing power. As is well
known, however, London’s suggestion to replace the scale
factor in the original theory with a phase factor would
make Weyl’s “gauge invariance” one of the central feature
of 20th century physics (Yang, 1986; O’Raifeartaigh and
Straumann, 2000).
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5. Reichenbach’s Relativity of Geometry
Reichenbach was of course completely aware of the
problem that “non-reproducibility of the gauge-unit” was
a relevant issue. He discussed it again as early as in §4
of his classical semi-popular Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-
Lehre, which he had already finished in 1926 (but will be
published as Reichenbach, 1928, tr. Reichenbach, 1958).
As is well known, according to Reichenbach, whereas the
definition of the concept of the unit of length is a concep-
tual definition, the choice of the interval that serves as a
unit of length is a coordinative definition — a definition
which coordinates an abstract concept with a “piece of re-
ality”, such as the meter standard in Paris (cfr. Shapiro,
1994). Reichenbach, however, adds this significant consid-
eration:
After this solution of the problem of the unit of
length, the next step leads to the comparison of two
units of lengths at different locations. . . . Assume
two measuring rods which are equal in length. They
are transported by different paths to a distant place;
there again they are laid down side by side and
found equal in length . . . it is an observational fact
[beobachtbare Tatsache], formulated in an empir-
ical statement [Erfahrungssatz], that two measur-
ing rods which are shown to be equal in length
by local comparison made at a certain space point
will be found equal in length by local comparison
at every other space point, whether they have been
transported along the same or different paths . . .
The physical fact makes the convention univocal
(eindeutig), i.e., independent of the path of trans-
portation. The statement about the univocalness
(Eindeutigkeit) of the convention is therefore em-
pirically verifiable and not a matter of choice. One
can say that the factual relations holding for a local
comparison of rods, though they do not require the
definition of congruence in terms of transported
rods, make this definition admissible. Definitions
that are not unique are inadmissible in a scientific
system (Reichenbach, 1928, 24f.; tr. 1958, 17; my
emphasis; trasnlation slightly modified).
Reichenbach is then aware that it is only “a matter of fact
that our world” admits a “univocal” definition of the unit
of measure (Reichenbach, 1928, 25; tr. 1958, 17); it is
only for the “factual relations holding for the behavior of
rigid rods” (Reichenbach, 1928, 27; tr. 1958, 17). The
choice of a rod as the standard unit of length is arbitrary,
is a matter of definition or convention, but it is a mat-
ter of fact that two of such unit rods are equal everywhere
when compared,. Reichenbach, like Einstein, accepted this
“fact” and elevated it as a very condition for a “coordina-
tive definition” (Reichenbach, 1928, 27; tr. 1958, 17).
However, the question of the univocality of the defini-
tion of the unit of measure is clearly not the central prob-
lem for Reichenbach. Rather, he moves quite abruptly to
the question of the definition of the “congruence of bodies”
(Reichenbach, 1928, §5), which is at the basis of his famous
“relativity of geometry” (Reichenbach, 1928, §8). Reichen-
bach famously claims that the relativity of geometry “is es-
sentially the result of the work of Riemann, Helmholtz, and
Poincaré” (Reichenbach, 1928, 48; tr. 1958, 35), who — in
Reichenbach’s view — first recognized that the geometry
of space, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean, rests on a
conventional definition of which bodies are rigid. Einstein
simply applied this approach to physics.
Of course, as Reichenbach himself noticed, even if only
by the end of the book, that “there are no rigid bodies”
in General Relativistic space-time; the concept of rigid-
ity “loses its definiteness in fields in which the adjustment
of measuring instruments is not uniform” (Reichenbach,
1928, 302; tr. 1958, 264). Reichenbach, however, believed
that he still had an “ace in the hole”; in General Rela-
tivity the coordinative definition does not concern finite
bodies, but rather “infinitesimal measuring instruments”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 302; tr. 1958, 264; my emphasis).
As it has been pointed out (Torretti, 1983, 239f.), how-
ever, Reichenbach’s approach is hardly compatible with
his conventionalism, as it paradoxically emerged from his
own account.
Reichenbach explains with the usual clarity that in or-
der to perform measurements, we “carry around infinites-
imal measuring rods” (Reichenbach, 1928, 285; tr. 1958,
249), which we assume to be unit rods. Riemann’s ge-
ometry assumes that the laws of disposition of such rods
more closely approach those of Euclidean geometry the
smaller the dimensions of the considered region of space
become. Rods are progressively more rigid to the extent
that they are smaller. If our rods do not show such a
Euclidean behavior, as Reichenbach observes, “we would
assume, therefore, that the unit rod was not chosen suf-
ficiently small and would claim that the axiom would be
satisfied if the rod were shortened” (Reichenbach, 1928,
286; tr. 1958, 250). So the rigidity of rods is evidently not
stipulated arbitrarily, but checked under the presupposi-
tion that space is Euclidean in small domains (Torretti,
1983, 239f.).
After having determined a rigid unit rod according to
this procedure, the geometry of space around a point can
then be found empirically, under the presupposition “that
ds2 be equal to 1 for the same gµν and any direction of
the rod rotated in P the gµν will be determined uniquely
[eindeutig]” (Reichenbach, 1928, 285; tr. 1958, 249) (up to
a coordinate transformation). If in small regions of space
gµνare necessarily constant, over larger regions of space,
we might discover that, by combining the coordinate dif-
ferentials according the Euclidean formula, “the resulting
ds2 is by no means equal to 1” (Reichenbach, 1928, 285;
tr. 1958, 249). We would then be forced to introduce “the
corrections factors gµν”, so “that the gµν thus obtained
will satisfy the condition ds2 = 1 for all positions of the
unit rod” (Reichenbach, 1928, 286; tr. 1958, 250). Other
observers in other regions of spacetime will the adopt the
same measurement procedure, and they will also find the
value of the gµν in their neighborhood. Riemannian ge-
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ometry presupposed that not only the ratio gµν = λg′µν ,
but the value of the constant λ can be determined after
all observers have come to agree on the unit of measure
to use: “Through experiment we discover at every point
those numbers gµν by which the coordinate differentials
must be multiplied in order that the interval will equal 1”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 287; tr. 1958, 251).
This procedure can of course be easily extended to the
case of a pseudo-Riemannian manifold of General Rela-
tivity, where “[t]he coordinative definition of congruence
is again given in terms of clocks, rods, and light rays”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 287; tr. 1958, 251). If the field equa-
tions predict a certain value of the gµν (up to a coordinate
transformation) — let’s say the Schwarzschild solution for
spatial spherical symmetry — we could then verify if the
predictions of the theory were “true” or “false”, using light
rays “as a realization of ds2 = 0, and infinitesimal clocks
and rods “as realizations of ds2 = ±1” (Reichenbach, 1928,
287; tr. 1958, 251).
This is of course perfectly true, but it is also worth clar-
ifying that this is not “a coordinative definition of congru-
ence” in the sense of Helmholtz and Poincaré. As we have
seen, the definition of “congruence of bodies” is not univo-
cal in General Relativity; there is no single set of congru-
ence relations; the very idea of making a unique conven-
tional choice among different incompatible sets does not
even make sense (Friedman, 1995). As Reichenbach had
explicitly shown in 1924, rods and clocks only serve to de-
termine the choice of the linear unit of measure, which in
General Relativity is regarded as arbitrary, but univocal.
Usually units of measure are defined with reference to
an individual standard, such as the meter standard pre-
served in Paris; of course, it is more useful when stan-
dards are defined through class terms, for instance “the
linear unit may be defined by means of the wave length
of the red cadmium line.3 The similarity of all cadmium
atoms is used for this purpose, and there is no need to
store a special unit at a definite location” (Reichenbach,
1929a, 30; tr. 1978, I, 161). The unit of measure can easily
be replicated all over the manifold.
Even though, in Reichenbach’s parlance, this is a “coor-
dinative definition”, clearly it does not concern the choice
among Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry. As we
have seen, by coordinating ds2 = −1 with another atom,
let’s say an atom of sodium with a yellow emitting line,
all lengths would be changed by a scale factor, but their
ratios would remain unchanged. Thus the spacetime met-
ric would remain the same, being defined only up to a
constant scale factor.
Rather, the real philosophical problem lurks in the
phrase, “there is no need to store a special unit at a definite
location”. The stability of atomic spectra shows that there
3In 1927, the International Conference on Weights and Measures
redefined the meter in terms of a red cadmium spectral line (1 m =
1,553,164.13 times the wavelength of the 6436.4696 Å cadmium red
line).
is a class of similar objects that can be used to reproduced
the unit of measure in different positions (Reichenbach,
1928, 355). According to Reichenbach, the “objects in
question are similar is, of course, not established by defini-
tion, but is a fact that must be discovered” (Reichenbach,
1929a, 30; tr. 1978, I, 161; my emphasis).
To find an explicit discussion about the nature of this
factual presupposition we must wait, however, for the long
appendix on Weyl’s theory (Reichenbach, 1928, 331-373):
The foundation of Riemannian space [is that] two
measuring rods which are found equal, when they
are compared near to each other, will be again
equally long if they are transported through dif-
ferent ways in another place; the same must be
assumed for the unit clocks . . . We have noticed
above that such a definition [of equality of length]
is only for this reason possible, because, the measuring-
bodies posses the mentioned special property [Vorzug-
seigenschaft]; if the measuring rods would have dif-
ferent length every time they met, the usual def-
inition of congruence would not be possible. The
mentioned property is not a means to obtain a
knowledge of the equality of tracts . . . but it is
a necessary condition for a definition of congru-
ence distinguished by this special property [Vorzug-
seigenschaft] (on this topic see § 4) (Reichenbach,
1928, 332)
Reichenbach refers here explicitly to the §4 of his book
where he discussed precisely the “univocality” of the def-
inition of “equality of tracts”. The fundamental question
is then the following. “What would happen if the mea-
suring rods would not posses the mentioned special prop-
erty [Vorzugseigenschaft]?” (Reichenbach, 1928, 332). Re-
ichenbach surprisingly consigned this question to the ap-
pendix of his book (which will not even be translated into
English). However, it is not at all exaggerated to argue
that this was the core problem of Einstein’s reflections on
geometry. Einstein had assumed the “Vorzugseigenschaft”
of rods and clocks as an independent “fact”; Weyl had
showed that the alleged fact is at most a “stipulation”.
Reichenbach explains very minutely the technical de-
tails of Weyl’s theory in the appendix (cf. Coffa, 1979).
A brief summary can be found, for instance, in a paper of
1929 discussing Einstein’s new geometry based on distant-
parallelism (on this topic cf. Sauer, 2006):
Weyl noticed that Riemannian geometry contains
a special presupposition: two measuring rods which,
if compared next to each other are equal, are al-
ways equal, if, after having been transported through
different ways, are compared again. Weyl asked,
whether it would be possible to conceive more gen-
eral geometrical relations, in which the rods change
their length in dependence from the way along
which they are transported; he found a mathemat-
ical procedure which allows to formulate this case
. . . In this way he produced an extension of the
Riemannian space-type of undeniable mathemati-
cal meaning, which he however wanted to apply
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also to the physical problem just described [the
unification of gravitation and electricity] . . . such
a theory, however, had to be abandoned for phys-
ical reasons; the effect of the electrical field on
transported clocks [predicted by the theory]* was
absent.
* One just has to think of an atomic clock, e.g.
the rotating electron system of the atom, whose
eventual change in frequency found expression in
the emitted spectral lines. (Reichenbach, 1929b,
121)
Of course, Reichenbach had good reasons to consider Weyl’s
theory as discredited (see for instance Weyl, 1929). Re-
ichenbach, however, does not seem to realize that, when
Einstein refers, rather sporadically, to Helmholtz and Poincaré,
he alludes exclusively to this “special presupposition” of
Riemannian geometry, i.e. the “Riemannian method of
space-measurements” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 121) of which
Weyl had shown the contingency by introducing “a more
richer geometry then the Riemannian one” (Reichenbach,
1929b, 121)
6. Einstein vs. Reichenbach. From the Real to the
Imaginary Dialogue
As is well know, Einstein’s esteem for Reichenbach
was so high that in 1926 he managed, together with Max
Planck, to create a teaching position for him in “natu-
ral philosophy” at the University of Berlin, where Re-
ichenbach remained until the 1930s (Hecht and Hoffmann,
1982). Nevertheless, Reichenbach’s famous doctrine of the
“relativity of geometry” shows that surprisingly he was un-
able to appreciate that Einstein’s reference to the dialogue
between Helmholtz and Poincaré was little more than an
homage and surely not the exposition of a philosophical
program.
Reichenbach’s attempt to name Einstein’s theory as
the heir of the Riemann-Helmholtz-Poincaré line was doomed
to failure. Reichenbach completely neglected the group-
theoretical implications of Helmholtz and Poincaré’s work
(Friedman, 1995) — implications on which other philoso-
phers such as Ernst Cassirer insisted (Cassirer, 1938, 1944,
1950, I, ch. 2; written in 1930s). Most of all he did not ap-
preciate the fact that Riemann’s work evolved along a dif-
ferent non-geometrical tradition — mainly in the work of
Christoffel, Ricci and Levi-Civita (Reich, 1994) — whose
geometrical significance was rediscovered only after Gen-
eral Relativity by Levi-Civita himself (Reich, 1992). The
philosophical problem raised by Weyl’s theory, which Ein-
stein was actually addressing, can be understood exclu-
sively within this tradition.
However, Reichenbach could certainly not be blamed
for having lost track in following Einstein’s complex “di-
alogical” network. Einstein resorted to the Logical Em-
piricists’ favorite language of “coordination” to address
Weyl’s holistic challenge, and at the same time presented
his dispute with Weyl as a novel version of the dialogue
between Helmholtz and Poincaré. Behind Einstein’s di-
alogical strategy probably lurks the exigence of extrap-
olating two general epistemological attitudes toward the
geometry-physics relationship — the standpoints A and B
of the Elsbach-review — from their more technical coun-
terparts.
Einstein conformed to a sort of “double truth doctrine”
all of his life. On the one hand, he never abandoned the
conception of geometry as an investigation of “local rela-
tions of idealized corporeal objects” (Einstein, 1930c, 173;
tr. in Pesic 2007, 173; see also Einstein, 1930a,b); ge-
ometry is “the science of laws governing the mutual po-
sition of practically rigid bodies” (Einstein, 1934, 227).
In Physik und Realität (Einstein, 1936), Einstein even de-
fined as a “fatal error [verhängnisvolle Irrtum]” the fact
that this conception of geometry “has fallen into oblivion”
(Einstein, 1936, 321, tr. 356).
On the other hand, Einstein candidly admits that, in
General Relativity, such an assumption is not completely
consistent. This is particularly clear in a famous passage of
his Autobiographical notes (written in 1946, but published
as Einstein, 1949a):
One is struck [by the fact] that the theory (ex-
cept for the four-dimensional space) introduces two
kinds of physical things, i.e., (1) measuring rods
and clocks, (2) all other things, e.g., the electro-
magnetic field, the material point, etc. This, in
a certain sense, is inconsistent; strictly speaking
measuring rods and clocks would have to be repre-
sented as solutions of the basic equations (objects
consisting of moving atomic configurations), not,
as it were, as theoretically self-sufficient entities.
However, the procedure justifies itself because it
was clear from the very beginning that the postu-
lates of the theory are not strong enough to deduce
sufficiently complete equations from them for phys-
ical events sufficiently free from arbitrariness, in
order to base upon such a foundation a theory of
measuring rods and clocks. If one did not wish to
forego a physical interpretation of the co-ordinates
in general (something which, in itself, would be
possible), it was better to permit such inconsis-
tency — with the obligation, however, of eliminat-
ing it at a later stage of the theory. But one must
not legalize the mentioned sin so far as to imagine
that intervals are physical entities of a special type,
intrinsically different from other physical variables
(Einstein, 1949a, 59; my emphasis).
Einstein’s epistemological preoccupations are then consis-
tent with those that he had expressed in the past. In the
final “Remarks Concerning the Essays Brought together
in this Co-operative Volume” (finished in 1948) he empha-
sizes the following points:
1. General Relativity assumes that there is “such a thing
as a natural object which incorporates the ‘natural-
measuring-rod’ independently of its position in four-
dimensional space”; in particular “a spectral line” is
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“considered as a measure of a ‘proper time’ (Eigen-
Zeit) (ds2 = gikdxidxk )”. This point of view “made
the invention of the General Theory of Relativity
psychologically possible, however this supposition is
logically not necessary” (Einstein, 1949b, 685; may
emphasis).
2. This assumption is then not definitive: Only “[if]
one disregards quantum structure, one can justify
the introduction of the gik ‘operationally’”, referring
to “the existence of an arbitrarily sharp optical sig-
nal” (Einstein, 1949b, 686, my emphasis). We do
not have at this time “a complete theory of physics
as a totality” in which “the objects used as tools
for measurement do not lead an independent exis-
tence alongside of the objects implicated by the field-
equations” (Einstein, 1949b, 686, my emphasis).
The echo of the debate with Weyl and Dällenbach (cf. §3)
in the late 1910s can still be heard in these passages written
thirty years later. The constancy of atoms gives physical
meaning to the mathematical invariant ds; within General
Relativity this remains an unverified assumption, which,
in a later stage of the development of physics, should be
derived from the theory.
As is well known, Einstein used exactly this form of
holism à la Weyl against Reichenbach in the final “Re-
marks” (Einstein, 1949b). Interestingly, Einstein again re-
sorts to the opposition between Helmholtz and Poincaré
to display the epistemological implications of the points
1. and 2.: “Is a geometry . . . verifiable (viz., falsifiable)
or not? Reichenbach, together with Helmholtz, says: Yes,
provided that the empirically given solid body realizes the
concept of “distance” Poincaré says no and consequently
is condemned by Reichenbach” (Einstein, 1949b, 677f.).
In his contribution to the volume, Reichenbach (Re-
ichenbach, 1949), who Einstein praises for “the precision of
deductions” and “the sharpness of his assertions”, namely
rehearsed his neo-conventionalist doctrine: after a defini-
tion of congruence has been chosen under the criterion that
it does not imply redundant physical forces, then geometry
of physical space (Euclidean or non-Euclidean) can be ver-
ified empirically using rods and clocks. Einstein famously
replied by imagining a dialogue between “Reichenbach”
and “Poincaré” (Einstein, 1949b). By the end of the di-
alogue an unidentified “Non-Positivist” bursts upon the
scene. The passage is famous, but it is worth repeating
again:
Non-Positivist: If, under the stated circumstances,
you hold distance to be a legitimate concept, how
then is it with your basic principle (meaning =
verifiability)? Do you not have to reach the point
where you must deny the meaning of geometrical
concepts and theorems and to acknowledge mean-
ing only within the completely developed theory of
relativity (which, however, does not yet exist at
all as a finished product)? Do you not have to
admit that, in your sense of the word, no “mean-
ing” can be attributed to the individual concepts
and assertions of a physical theory at all, and to
the entire system only insofar as it makes what is
given in experience “intelligible?” Why do the in-
dividual concepts which occur in a theory require
any specific justification anyway, if they are only
indispensable within the framework of the logical
structure of the theory, and the theory only in its
entirety validates itself? (Einstein, 1949b, 678; my
emphasis)
By substituting a non-Positivist for Poincaré, Einstein had
probably come to realize that such a holism was not really
implied by Poincaré’s conventionalism, being rather simi-
lar to Pierre Duhem’s epistemological stance (Grünbaum,
1963a, 133; for the historical plausibility of this hypothesis,
see Howard, 1990).
The holism of the non-Positivist, however, clearly re-
sembles that of Weyl’s philosophy of geometry. In his 1949
English-augmented translation (Weyl, 1949) of his 1927
monograph Philosophie der Mathemaik und der Naturwis-
senschaft (Weyl, 1927), Weyl explicitly argues that geom-
etry and physics can only be “put to the test as a whole”
(Weyl, 1949, 134). Weyl’s objections to Einstein were still
vivid thirty years after their original dispute had started.
It must be kept in mind that Einstein and Weyl were col-
leagues for nearly twenty years in Princeton. In an “Ap-
pendix” of the book Weyl still insisted on the fact that “the
behavior of rods and clocks” should in principle come out
“as a remote consequence of the fully developed theory”
and not be used to measure “the fundamental quantity
ds2” (Weyl, 1949, 288).
Beller’s dialogical method once again becomes very use-
ful. Einstein addressed several interlocutors at one time,
interweaving different real dialogues in an imaginary one,
in which, moreover, contenders from disparate epochs ap-
pear. Einstein’s dialogical web it is then not easy to dis-
entangle. Reichenbach, after all, could have gotten the
impression that Einstein was attributing to him a view of
the empirical character of geometry not unlike that which
Einstein himself had used as a stepping-stone (and that
he still defended in a 1951 letter to the Australian student
Leonard Champion as reported by Stachel, 1989). How-
ever, it is quite clear that Einstein was addressing Weyl’s
objection; the apple of discord was once again “the exis-
tence of an arbitrarily sharp optical signal”, that can be
used to reproduce the unit of time at distance.
However, Logical Empiricists clearly still did not grasp
this point. It is sufficient to consult their reviews of Schilpp’s
volume which came up immediately after its publication
(Frank, 1949; Nagel, 1950). Similarly in his 1951 response
to “Professor Einstein[’s]” “witty defense of convention-
alism” (Reichenbach, 1951, 135), Reichenbach simply re-
hearsed once again his neo-conventionalist position, en-
tirely based on the question of establishing whether the
choice among Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries de-
pends on an empirical or conventional definition of con-
gruence. It is rather ironic that Reichenbach argued “that
there can be no differences of opinion between mathemati-
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cal philosophers if only their opinions were clearly stated”
(Reichenbach, 1951, 135). The lifelong dialogue that he
had with Einstein, which traversed thirty years of their
professional careers, seems to have been based on a com-
plete misunderstanding.
7. Conclusion: A Dialogue of the Deaf
Modern philosophy of science is highly indebted to the
dialogue between Einstein, Schlick and Reichenbach on the
role of rods and clocks in General Relativity. Through this
dialogue, Logical Empiricism made its first steps as a philo-
sophical movement, which, especially in its “American in-
carnation” dominated 20th century philosophy of science,
before stiffening into an over-simplified straw-man version
that only recent historical literature has began to call into
question.
However, this dialogue was surprisingly a dialogue of
the deaf. The reason is disarmingly simple: Logical Em-
piricists were concerned with the question of making a
choice within the class of Riemannian geometries. Ein-
stein was rather worried by the legitimacy of the assump-
tion that characterizes the class of Riemannian geometries
as such, as included in the larger class of geometries put
forward by Weyl. Logical Empiricists knew the latter is-
sue perfectly well, but they never realized that Weyl was
the interlocutor Einstein was actually addressing. In turn,
Einstein never felt compelled to set things straight, so the
illusion persisted that the subject of the debate revolved
around the conventional vs. empirical choice between Eu-
clidean and non-Euclidean geometries. This turned out to
be a “a stubbornly persistent illusion”, which was dragged
along into successive famous debates, e.g. the Grünbaum-
Putnam controversy (Grünbaum, 1963b; Putnam, 1963;
Grünbaum, 1968b,a, ch. III).
As Grünbaum’s “Riemann-Poincaré principle of the con-
ventionality of congruence” shows (cf. Giedymin, 1982),
the misunderstanding between Einstein and Logical Em-
piricists is the result of what may be called a collision of
mathematical traditions (Norton, 1999): The “Helmholtzian”
tradition, which presupposes the “existence of bodies in-
dependent of position” and the “Riemannian” tradition,
which started from the much weaker presupposition that
“length lines is independent of position” (Freudenthal, 1956;
Torretti, 1978, 1999).
Helmholtz’s geometrical point of view was developed
mathematically mainly by Sophus Lie (starting from Lie,
1886) in the theory of a continuous group of transforma-
tions (Lie, 1893), and was brought to its epistemological
consequences by Poincaré (Friedman, 1995; Heinzmann,
2001 and others). Riemann’s geometrical insight, how-
ever, remained dormant; it was mainly developed non-
geometrically by Rudolph Lipschitz (Lipschitz, 1869), Christof-
fel, and Ricci in the form of a theory of differential invari-
ants (Ricci-Curbastro, 1883, 1886, 1888, 1889), later sys-
tematized into the so-called “absolute differential calculus”
(Ricci-Curbastro, 1892; Levi-Civita and Ricci-Curbastro,
1900), of which General Relativity, by Einstein’s own ac-
count, was the “triumph” (Reich, 1994). The geometrical
implications of Riemann’s revolutionary approach were re-
discovered only after the appearance of General Relativ-
ity, by, among others, Levi-Civita and Hessenberg, and
appeared in radicalized form in Weyl “gauge invariance”
principle.
Einstein’s assumption that the relative length of rods
does not depend on their pre-history is comprehensible
only in the context of the “Riemannian” tradition. Log-
ical Empiricists not only completely neglected the group-
theoretical implications of Helmholtz’s approach, but most
of all did not accord sufficient attention to the role that
Riemann and his successors had played in the history of
the epistemology of geometry. Neglecting the distinction
between the Riemannian and the Helmholtzian tradition
in the history of the philosophy of geometry, in an attempt
to furnish “a Helmholtzian approach to space and time”
(Darrigol, 2007) confuses, not unlike the Logical Empiri-
cists, the problem of the comparability of the length lines
at a distance with that of the congruence of bodies (Tor-
retti, 1983, 238f.).
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